In conversation with N1, Loizides warns: Bosnia cannot afford another wrong turn

"Power-sharing is by definition a political system based on the principles of compromise and shared decision-making. Bosnia’s political system was not meant to be an exception to this rule and one could argue it was necessary for ending the war", he reflected.

Yet, according to Loizides, the logic underpinning the Dayton system has shown clear limitations. "Comparative constitutionalists point to the Dayton system’s failing logic; the system relied excessively on ethnic vetoes and ethnicity as key markers for the election of officials including the three presidents", he said. He notes that power-sharing experts have proposed more inclusive parliamentary models to avoid the overconcentration of power in strong personalities—a dynamic he believes is playing out in Bosnia today. Drawing comparisons, he remarked that even post-authoritarian federations such as Iraq have fared better with parliamentary frameworks. "The crafters of Dayton relied instead on external intervention/arbitration to address the inherent problems of a system they themselves wrongly designed. Sustaining such a system has proven to be increasingly more difficult over time."

Ethnic vetoes and contested sovereignties

Asked about Milorad Dodik's persistent nationalist rhetoric and legal moves aimed at undermining Bosnia's state institutions, Loizides was cautious but firm. "I am not an expert on RS politics", he prefaced, but warned that any assumption that global geopolitics might favour the dismantling of Bosnia's territorial integrity would likely prove misguided. "Among liberal democracies, the overwhelming view is that the compromise in Dayton was already disproportionately favourable to ethnic demands, including the Serbian position. For most EU countries it’s unlikely to tolerate a move that further deepens division. Making the wrong move at the wrong time has always been a problem in the region but this is certainly going to have devastating consequences."

Loizides sees Bosnia as not unique in its experience of federal tensions. Legalistic arguments used by Republika Srpska’s leadership to justify recent legislative actions as a "return" to the original Dayton Agreement reflect a pattern observed in other post-conflict federations. "Federal systems are meant to adapt", he observed, pointing to new constitutional rulings, domestic agreements, and international norms. "On the one hand, it's legitimate for any of the sides to point to a past agreement, but on the other they have to also take into consideration the changing needs of the federation." He emphasised that it is not just a matter of interpretation, but also implementation: "Another factor is the degree to which each side has implemented its agreements and whether RS has implemented indeed the original Dayton both in practice and spirit."

EU integration and the Cyprus precedent

As the European Union revisits its enlargement policy amid geopolitical volatility, the question of Bosnia's candidacy has returned to the fore. Could the EU, as it did with Cyprus, accept a member state with unresolved internal divisions?

"That’s a fair point", Loizides acknowledged. He stressed that the rest of the country should not be indefinitely held hostage by RS leadership. "It would be extremely unjustifiable to the side that implements its commitments and international law." He believes that there are possible models for navigating such a scenario, including the temporary suspension of the acquis communautaire in parts of a new member state. "But learning also from Cyprus, there should be a flexible mechanism—often referred to as a backstop—that would allow RS to be re-integrated to the federation and eventually to the European Union."

Proportionality and international law

Loizides was also asked about recent efforts by RS authorities to limit the reach of Bosnia's judiciary and investigative agencies within the entity. These moves have been framed by RS leaders as a defence of the original Dayton, on the basis that such institutions were later additions.

He offered a nuanced legal view: "There is a legal dimension to this which involves not only evaluating whether amendments have been consensual and/or constitutional but also the principle of proportionality (how much a side escalates in response to a perceived provocation)." He cautioned that "an act of secession, partial or covert, is extremely problematic from the point of view of international law."

Space for moderate alternatives

Loizides also commented on the fact that opposition parties in Republika Srpska have refrained from fully aligning with Dodik’s more extreme positions. "My impression from Cyprus and elsewhere is that secessionist projects rarely enjoy overwhelming popular support, at least not for a long time", he said. Citing the political shifts among Turkish Cypriots since 2000, he noted: "The two fractions (secessionist/federalist) have been replacing each other in power every five years."

He emphasised the importance of long-term thinking and strategic patience in such moments. "There will be an opportunity to work with the RS opposition in the future and Bosnia could then capitalise on its potential to join the EU. It will be mutually beneficial as Europe will also benefit from rewarding a successful functioning federation—we all need an inspiring model."